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One of the most significant reforms contained 
within the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) is the requirement that states 
create—or have the federal government cre-
ate—health insurance exchanges. Designed to 
help individuals and small businesses shop for 
and purchase health insurance, access pre-
mium and cost-sharing subsidies, and facilitate 
health plan competition based on price and 
quality, these exchanges are projected to be the 
gateway for approximately 29 million people to 
access coverage.
Exchanges are not new, and two states in particular 
have garnered national attention for illustrating the 
diverse approaches states may take to establishing and 
maintaining an exchange. To many, the Massachusetts 
and Utah exchanges represent opposite points on a 
continuum of what exchanges can provide for consumers 
and small businesses. Yet the stereotype of Massachusetts’ 
exchange as an “active purchaser” and the Utah Exchange 
as the open market model is, in the words of one observer, 
“a false stereotype…perpetuated by… a media that likes 
simple contrasts.”
In our research we found a much more complicated 
picture of each exchange. We examine three primary 
dimensions of each exchange: the quality and choice 
of plans, the affordability of coverage, and ease of 
enrollment. Selected “lessons learned” from both states 
include the following:
  • It’s not an “either-or” choice. States seeking to 
establish their own exchanges do not need to choose 
either the Massachusetts or the Utah model. While 
the ACA sets some minimum standards, states have 
discretion to develop an approach that will best 
serve the residents of their state, including elements 
from both the Massachusetts and Utah models. The 
experience of both states underscores that ongoing 
refinement will be necessary.
  • Policymakers must consider exchanges’ 
interactions with broader insurance market rules. 
Massachusetts’ Connector grew from market reforms 
previously in place, while Utah moved to reform 
its statewide small group rating rules to improve 
exchange outcomes. Further, the ACA’s market 
reforms and standards for exchanges may address some 
of the challenges both states are facing. For example, 
the ACA’s prohibition on health status underwriting 
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in 2014 will allow Utah to simplify what is currently a 
complicated rating and enrollment process. 
  • Exchanges can be effective market innovators. 
For both exchanges, perhaps the most innovative 
contribution to the landscape is the web-based 
mechanism through which consumers and small 
business owners can make informed comparisons 
among health plans. Massachusetts’ Connector in 
particular has used decision-support tools and a 
streamlined set of benefit packages to help make 
consumers’ purchasing decisions simpler and easier. 
And giving consumers confidence that they are 
choosing among quality products, i.e., through 
certification or a “Seal of Approval,” can promote the 
selection of lower cost plans.
  • Exchanges require the participation of both 
consumers and health plans. A successful exchange 
must strike a balance between effective consumer 
protections and being attractive to the insurance 
carriers from whom enrollees wish to purchase. The 
stereotype of Massachusetts as an “active purchaser” is 
belied by the fact that the Connector has never turned 
away a carrier that expressed a wish to participate, 
while on the other hand, Utah’s open market has not 
attracted all of that state’s carriers. Both states have 
made efforts to encourage insurers to participate. 
  • Effective “active purchasing” requires market 
knowledge and nimbleness in the face of 
consumer demands. Even without the leverage of 
premium subsidies, the Massachusetts Connector 
has effectively streamlined the insurance products 
on its shelves in part through market research that 
provided clear data that consumers were demanding 
greater standardization of products. However, being 
an active purchaser requires staff expertise and 
resources. As one observer put it, “If you want to take 
‘any willing plan,’ it’s a lot easier. But then you don’t 
add much value, either.”
  • You get what you pay for. While the Connector’s $30 
million budget is dramatically more than what the 
Utah Exchange spends for administration, it reflects 
both substantially higher enrollment (approximately 
220,000 vs. 2,200) as well as a much broader scope 
of responsibilities. In addition, the lack of budget and 
staff has made it difficult for the Utah Exchange to 
respond and adjust to problems as they arise.
  • Exchanges without associated subsidies can do 
little to make insurance more affordable. Premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies will be critical for most 
individuals and will help exchanges attract and sustain 
their enrollment. But for those who are unsubsidized, 
such as small business purchasers, exchanges will likely 
struggle to provide a product that is more affordable 
than what is available in the outside market. The 
ACA’s small business tax credit will help small group 
exchanges with enrollment, but it is narrowly targeted 
and limited to three years.
  • A “defined contribution” model for employer-
sponsored coverage will not necessarily attract 
small employers to exchanges. Utah’s creation of 
a “defined contribution” market inside its Exchange 
for small employers was designed with the twin goals 
of helping employers limit their financial exposure to 
rising health costs and encouraging employees to select 
lower-cost plans. In practice, however, implementation 
of a defined contribution model for small businesses in 
both states does not appear to have enticed more small 
employers to enter the market. And in Utah, it appears 
that many participating employees have simply 
stayed with the plan they were in before, rather than 
exercising their new ability to “shop” for new policies.
  • Public outreach and simple enrollment are keys 
to success. Exchanges must attract a critical mass 
of enrollees early on to be sustainable. Extensive 
public education about consumers’ new rights and 
responsibilities will be necessary, as well as one-
on-one assistance to help those who are new to the 
process. And if the eligibility and enrollment process 
is burdensome and time consuming, it will discourage 
many from participating, particularly those not 
eligible for subsidies (including small businesses).
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One of the most significant reforms contained within 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
is the requirement that states create—or have the 
federal government create—health insurance exchanges. 
Designed to help individuals and small businesses shop 
for and purchase health insurance, access premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies, and facilitate health plan 
competition based on price and quality, these exchanges 
are projected to be the gateway for approximately 29 
million people to access coverage.1
States have flexibility in the design and implementation 
of exchanges under the ACA. For example, they can open 
their exchange to all qualified plans within the state, or 
they can limit participation to certain plans. They can 
provide an almost unlimited number of product choices 
for consumers, or they can establish a standardized set of 
benefits and limit the number of products. They can offer 
separate small business and individual market exchanges, 
or merge the two. They can run a solely state-based 
exchange, operate multiple exchanges in the state, or 
partner with other states to run a regional exchange.
Exchanges are not new, and two states in particular 
have garnered national attention for illustrating the 
diverse approaches states may take to establishing and 
maintaining an exchange. Massachusetts established its 
exchange (the “Connector”) as part of a comprehensive 
health reform effort in 2006, and Utah first piloted its 
exchange in 2009. To many, the Massachusetts and Utah 
exchanges represent opposite points on a continuum of 
what exchanges can and should provide for consumers 
and small businesses. As one Utah official put it, “Utah 
and Massachusetts may well serve as bookends for other 
states.”2 In this framework, Utah’s exchange represents 
a pure “free market” approach to the regulation and 
oversight of an insurance market, while the Massachusetts 
Connector represents a proactive, hands-on approach. 
Utah officials stress that until January 2011, Utah’s 
Exchange had only experienced a “Limited Launch” and 
much more will be learned in the year ahead.
This paper provides a closer look at these two exchanges 
and reveals a much more complex and nuanced picture of 
each exchange in their design, execution, and impact on 
consumers and small business owners. We examine three 
primary dimensions: the quality and choice of plans, the 
affordability of coverage, and ease of enrollment.
To prepare this report, we conducted stakeholder 
interviews with key constituencies in both Massachusetts 
and Utah in person and by telephone between December 
2010 and February 2011. We analyzed various 
program materials, secondary source materials and 
other data during this period as well. To preserve the 
confidentiality of those interviewed, in most cases we 
have identified them only by occupation or affiliation. 
The findings in the paper are the authors’ alone and 
should not be attributed to any individual or group with 
whom we spoke.
Introduction
Background on Massachusetts’ and Utah’s Exchanges
Insurance Markets
The Utah Health Exchange and Massachusetts 
Connector both operate within their states’ existing 
insurance markets. Each state has laws and regulations 
that set the rules for insurance sold to its citizens, and 
the way in which the broader health insurance market 
works has informed the creation of the exchanges and 
their ongoing development. Massachusetts established 
its exchange in 2006 when its percentage of uninsured 
was 10.6%; the rate declined to 4.4% in 2009.3 Health 
insurance premiums in Massachusetts are among the 
highest in the nation.4 In addition, Massachusetts has 
long had a market dominated by local, non-profit health 
plans that have historically been rated highly on quality 
and customer service. And while one large carrier has 
significant market share, the insurance market is less 
concentrated than in many other states.5 In Utah, the 
health system reforms that led to its exchange began in 
2008, when the state’s uninsurance rate was 13.2%; the 
rate rose to 14.8% in 2009.6 The cost of coverage in Utah 
ranks in the bottom tier of states—44th in 2009.7 
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Since the mid-90s, Massachusetts has required guaranteed 
issue of insurance to individuals and groups, and 
prohibited health plans from charging higher premiums 
to individuals or groups based on their health status, 
although they can vary based on age or geographic 
location (called “modified community rating”). Utah, on 
the other hand, previously allowed considerable variation 
in premiums in the small group market based on health 
status, gender, industry, group size, and other factors—
the highest rates could vary up to 25 times the lowest.8 
Both states, though, made changes to their insurance 
market rules as they developed their exchanges.
In establishing its exchange, Massachusetts enacted 
insurance reforms to merge the individual and small 
group markets, so they now form one risk pool, subject 
to the same rules. While the merger had a small impact 
on premiums, it was moderated by the Commonwealth’s 
prior insurance reforms aligning the rating and 
guaranteed issue rules between the two markets. In 
addition, to address concerns about adverse selection 
against its exchange, insurance products must be priced 
the same whether they are marketed inside or outside the 
Connector. These reforms have helped Massachusetts 
launch and sustain its exchange with minimal disruption 
to its insurance markets. 
In Utah, policymakers responded to concerns about price, 
low enrollment and the number of available plans in the 
Exchange with further regulation of Utah’s small group 
market. They required small group rating practices to be 
the same inside and outside of the Exchange and limited 
rating criteria to age, family composition, and geographic 
area. They required more plan options to be offered in 
the Exchange and moved to penalize insurers who do 
not participate in the Exchange market by disallowing 
them from joining later. The application timeframe was 
changed from an annual open enrollment period to a 
rolling process that allows for effective dates throughout 
the year.9 
Vision and Goals
Just as the establishment of American Health Benefit 
Exchanges has been viewed as integral to national health 
insurance reform, the establishment of the Massachusetts 
Connector in 2006 was seen as critical to achieving the 
Commonwealth’s vision of universal or near-universal 
coverage through the combination of insurance reforms, 
premium subsidies and “shared responsibility” to obtain 
or offer coverage.10
The enabling statute identifies the “purpose” of the 
Connector as facilitating the “availability, choice and 
adoption of private health insurance plans to eligible 
individuals and groups….”11 And the statute charges 
the Connector’s Board with facilitating the “purchase of 
health care insurance products…at an affordable price.”12 
As established, the Massachusetts Connector manages 
two exchanges: Commonwealth Care (“CommCare”) 
for individuals below 300% of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL)13 and eligible for premium subsidies, and 
Commonwealth Choice (“CommChoice”) for individuals 
not eligible for premium help. CommChoice also includes 
“Business Express,” a program for businesses with up to 
50 employees. 
Similarly, Utah’s health insurance exchange is a major 
piece of the health system reform efforts that have been 
underway in that state since 2008. Legislation passed 
in 2008 created the Health System Reform Task Force, 
made up of state legislators, to develop and implement 
a strategic plan for health reform in Utah.14 The Task 
Force, in turn, spearheaded the passage of legislation in 
2009 to create the Utah Health Exchange. The Exchange 
is intended to facilitate the state’s transition to a health 
care system that enhances the collection and sharing of 
information required by consumers, employers, insurers, 
and agents/brokers. The Utah Exchange is envisioned 
to become a clearinghouse for all of the state’s health 
insurance markets and aims to:
  • Provide consumers with helpful information about 
their health care and health care financing
  • Provide a mechanism for consumers to compare and 
choose a health insurance policy that meets their 
families’ needs
  • Provide a standardized electronic application and 
enrollment system15
The core missions of the Utah Health Exchange are to 
facilitate communication between parties and to create 
a defined contribution option for employers. It does not 
provide premium subsidies and has thus far focused only 
on the small group market. Further, it acts as a market 
organizer rather than an active purchaser—that is, it does 
not “negotiate” on prices, set minimum quality standards, 
or attempt to limit variation among plan offerings. 
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Governance and Financing
Massachusetts established the Connector as a “quasi-
public agency, outside the supervision or control of the 
Executive branch.”16 However, as a practical matter the 
Connector works very closely with the Executive branch 
to meet the goals established under the 2006 reform law. 
The authorizing statute created a Board of Directors to 
govern the Connector, composed of 11 members. To 
promote cross-agency coordination, the Board includes 
the Secretary for Administration and Finance (who serves 
as Chair), the Director of Medicaid, Commissioner of 
Insurance, and the Executive Director of the health 
benefits agency for state employees, who serve as ex-officio 
members. The balance of the Board is comprised of a 
mix of stakeholders and experts, including representatives 
of small businesses, consumers, and organized labor. In 
addition, the law requires the appointment of an actuary, 
a health benefits plan specialist, and a health economist. 
The law prohibits any representative of a health insurance 
company from serving on the Board, but in 2010 the 
legislature enacted a new requirement that one Board seat 
be held by an insurance broker.17
The Connector was financed through an initial $25 
million appropriation, but now is self-sustaining 
through surcharges on health plan premiums. Its current 
operating budget is approximately $30 million, with a 
staff of 46 full-time employees. This level of funding 
allows the Connector to meet its broad obligations under 
the 2006 reform law, such as outreach, public education 
and marketing, eligibility and enrollment services, and 
market surveys and focus groups to assess consumer and 
employer needs.
The Utah Health Exchange is administered by the Office 
of Consumer Health Services within the Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development (GOED). It operates 
on a relatively small budget—a $600,000 initial 
appropriation and ongoing support from GOED for 
the Exchange’s two staff members. The vendors that 
operate the Exchange also charge $6 per employee per 
month to support system operations and employees are 
charged $37 per month as a fee for the brokers who 
support enrollment. Utah’s governor appoints members 
to a Risk Adjuster Board, which manages the risk sharing 
mechanisms for the Exchange’s defined contribution 
market.18 Utah law further provides for an Exchange 
advisory board that consists of representatives of state 
agencies, insurers, producers, and consumers.19 
Activities
Massachusetts’ health reform law established the 
Connector not just to help organize the insurance 
marketplace and improve consumers’ ability to make 
informed health insurance purchasing decisions, but 
empowered it also to make fundamental policy decisions 
relating to the Commonwealth’s reform efforts. For 
example, the Connector was charged with defining 
“minimum creditable coverage”—the minimum level 
of coverage all state residents must have to satisfy 
the requirement to maintain insurance coverage. In 
addition, the Connector is responsible for setting and 
updating an affordability schedule, which establishes the 
maximum amount, based on a percentage of income, an 
individual or family must pay for insurance. These early 
foundational decisions were the focus of extensive debate 
and some controversy.20 Because the ACA sets standards 
for the essential benefits package and affordability of 
premiums, most state exchanges will not required to 
wrestle with these difficult policy choices unless their state 
chooses to go beyond the minimum federal requirements.
However, just as exchanges will be required to do 
under the ACA, the Connector determines eligibility 
for individuals and groups to purchase through the 
Connector and receive subsidies. It also determines 
whether an individual may receive a waiver from the 
requirement to maintain insurance, enrolls individuals 
and small employer groups into coverage, and collects and 
distributes premium payments.21
Many observers consider the Connector’s most innovative 
contribution to the reform landscape to be the web-
based mechanism through which consumers and small 
business owners can make informed, “apples-to-apples” 
comparisons among health plans and quickly and simply 
purchase the policy of their choice. 
The Connector currently enrolls approximately 220,000 
individuals in coverage, through both the subsidized and 
unsubsidized products. Of this figure, 4500 are enrolled 
through small business employers.22 Commonwealth 
Care, for subsidized individuals, accounts for 38% of the 
state’s coverage expansion. However, for those who don’t 
receive subsidies, a large portion of the newly insured 
continue to access coverage outside of the Connector—as 
of March 31, 2010, about 72,000 of the newly insured 
purchased coverage through their employer or on their 
own from private insurance carriers.23
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While it aims to transform all of Utah’s health insurance 
markets, to date the Utah Health Exchange has focused 
almost entirely on developing a defined contribution 
market for the state’s employers. This market does not 
provide state subsidies to enrollees24 and is open only 
to small businesses. While the state planned a pilot for 
large group employers in early 2011, as of February it is 
on hold. 
Typically in the small group market, employers choose 
a plan and contribute toward employees’ premiums, 
while employees have limited plan options. Insurance 
carriers in Utah’s small group market require employers 
to contribute at least 50% of the premium. The 
defined contribution market inside Utah’s Exchange, 
by contrast, prohibits insurers from requiring that 
employers contribute at least 50% of the premium, 
allowing employers to choose what percentage of the 
premium they wish to cover or to pay a fixed dollar 
amount. This set or “defined” contribution option can 
give employers more predictability in health insurance 
costs from year to year, but as health costs rise, a set 
dollar amount may cover less of the total premium 
that employees face. Unless employers choose to vary 
contributions based on age, a set dollar amount is also 
likely to result in older employees paying significantly 
more in premiums than younger ones. 
The greater range of plans available on the Exchange may 
give families with higher health needs access to plan options 
with more robust benefits than they would otherwise have, 
but the defined employer contribution may not be sufficient 
to make the plan affordable for such employees. Conversely, 
the greater number of plan options could give an individual 
or family with low health needs access to a more bare-bones 
insurance policy at a lower premium. The Exchange’s design 
also allows it to serve as a “premium aggregator,” that is, 
it can allow employees to apply premiums from different 
sources to the purchase of a product of their choice. Thus, an 
employee with contributions from multiple employers or a 
couple with contributions from each spouses’ employers can 
use funds from all available sources to cover a portion of their 
plan’s premium.25
The Utah Exchange’s defined contribution market opened 
in a limited launch in August 2009 to small employers 
with 2–50 employees. By January 2010, thirteen 
businesses with 161 employees participated.26 By February 
2011, the Exchange reported that 811 employees of small 
businesses and 1,370 dependents participated, for a total 
enrollment of 2,181. Relatively low participation has been 
attributed to higher premium rates inside the Exchange 
than were available outside, as well as to an onerous 
application, rating, and plan selection process, which is 
described below.27 
Quality and Choice of Plans for Consumers  
and Small Businesses
While the roughly 40,000 members of the Connector’s 
CommChoice* program are not currently eligible for 
premium or cost-sharing subsidies, a key goal of the 
Massachusetts reform effort is to give these individuals 
and families confidence that any health insurance product 
they purchase would provide high quality, cost-efficient, 
and comprehensive coverage.28 The law thus requires 
health insurance carriers to receive the Connector’s 
“Seal of Approval,” be state licensed, and meet enhanced 
transparency requirements.29 In determining whether 
a carrier merits the Seal of Approval, the most recent 
requirements listed by the Connector include:
  • Participate in all CommChoice offerings (i.e., 
individual, small group, and young adult plans);
  • Offer all standardized benefit packages for all plan 
benefit levels (Gold, Silver, Bronze);
  • Offer all products with the broadest possible provider 
network available to the carrier; and
  • Offer products that offer “good value” with 
comprehensive benefits.30
Currently, seven insurance carriers have received the Seal 
of Approval and offer products through CommChoice.31 
* As noted above, the Massachusetts Connector operates two exchanges: CommCare as the marketplace for individuals eligible for subsidies and CommChoice as the 
entry point for unsubsidized individuals and small businesses. Because CommCare was for several years statutorily circumscribed in the type of plan it could accept, 
this section focuses primarily on CommChoice as the locus of comparison.
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The law requires all carriers with more than 5000 
enrollees in the nongroup market to submit a bid to 
the Connector, but a few carriers have structured their 
bids in such a way as to make it clear they do not wish 
to participate.32,33 While the Connector has a national 
reputation as an “active purchaser,” in fact it has never 
turned away a carrier that expressed a wish to participate, 
and it offers all of the large and mid-sized HMOs in 
Massachusetts. As the Connector’s former Executive 
Director, Jon Kingsdale, observed to us: “The ‘active 
purchaser’ vs. ‘Travelocity’ dichotomy is a false stereotype 
of the Massachusetts Connector and the Utah Exchange, 
perpetuated by…a media that likes simple contrasts.”34
With CommChoice, the Connector engages in an 
ongoing balancing act. On the one hand, it promises 
consumers that it will screen carriers based on a 
high standard of quality.35 And it delivers: of the six 
participating carriers with sufficient experience to be 
rated, all receive four stars or an “Excellent” accreditation 
status according to the health plan report card published 
by the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA).36 This helps give consumers confidence that 
they can choose a lower-priced or less well-known plan 
without sacrificing on quality. 
On the other hand, if the Connector sets the bar too 
high, or imposes requirements that carriers find too 
burdensome, it will be unable to attract a sufficient 
mix of the plans that consumers want. Kingsdale uses 
this analogy: CommChoice is an insurance store, it 
sells health plans. Without premium subsidies as bait, 
the store has to offer better value to attract customers, 
and it cannot do so without a broad choice of plans.37 
Recently, the Connector has tried to add more value to 
CommChoice by streamlining the shopping experience, 
so that consumers can make easier comparisons among 
insurance products. The Connector’s interactive website 
allows consumers to compare products based on benefit 
tier, monthly cost, annual deductible and insurance 
carrier.38 And the Connector is planning to launch 
soon a provider search tool that will allow consumers to 
determine whether their chosen physicians or hospitals are 
within a plan’s network.39
In the early years of the Connector, plans were allowed 
to vary cost-sharing considerably within each benefit 
level. However, in consumer focus groups, respondents 
indicated that the degree of choice originally offered 
through the Connector was overwhelming.40 As a result, 
the Connector now requires participating carriers to offer 
a standardized set of benefit packages. Currently, carriers 
can offer only one Gold product, three Silver products, 
and three Bronze products. The Connector provides 
cost-sharing specifications for each product based on 
their surveys of the market that indicate what products 
consumers are choosing. As a result of this market 
research and feedback from participating carriers, the 
Connector is further streamlining its shelves by limiting 
the Silver level to just two product designs.41
The Connector’s limits on plans’ flexibility serve two 
purposes. First, as indicated above, standardizing the 
products on the Connector’s shelves makes it easier and 
faster for consumers to compare like products and make 
better-informed purchasing decisions. Second, and less 
obvious, is that standardization limits insurers’ ability 
to use benefit design to attract healthy individuals and 
discourage high-risk individuals from purchasing their 
products. According to Kingsdale: “One objective of 
reform is to narrow the opportunity for insurers to 
compete mainly on risk selection. If you can narrow 
that opportunity, you can focus insurers on value as a 
business strategy.”42
The Connector’s push for greater benefit standardization 
has not come without dissent. Health plan representatives 
in the Commonwealth express concerns that the 
standardized products limit their efforts to implement 
value-based benefit design and provider tiering strategies 
to contain costs.43 Health plans in Massachusetts are, 
however, only constrained in what they must offer 
inside the Connector. They can sell innovative new 
benefit designs outside the Connector, as long as they 
are compliant with the state’s private insurance rules. 
However, in its most recent RFP, the Connector is 
accommodating plans’ concerns by loosening some of the 
prescriptiveness on cost-sharing.44
The Massachusetts Connector’s experience stands 
in contrast to the approach taken by Utah’s Health 
Exchange. According to its proponents, one of its 
key assets is the significant expansion of consumer 
choice. In 2010, there were 146 plan options for 436 
enrollees, although not all of these options are available 
to everyone.45,46 For employees of small businesses who 
would typically have very limited choice of insurance 
products, access to the Exchange is likely to result in more 
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options with respect to plan networks, benefits, cost-
sharing arrangements, premiums and insurance carriers.47 
And proponents believe that enhancing consumer choice 
will result in consumers choosing products that are more 
cost effective, which in turn will lead to reductions in the 
rate of health care cost growth.
Utah’s Exchange does have mechanisms to simplify the 
shopping experience for consumers through software 
programs that help narrow the options based on family 
structure, health history, income, and other factors. 
In practice, however, the large number of choices 
appears to be overwhelming and confusing to potential 
enrollees. According to a Utah agent who has worked 
with many small businesses exploring the Exchange, 
many employees enroll in the “default” product because 
they prefer to have their product chosen for them 
and the default option was most similar to what they 
had purchased previously outside the Exchange. The 
Exchange has begun to track data on employees’ plan 
choices and expects to have more accurate information 
later this year. Most enrollees appear to choose a few 
plan options. In a survey conducted by the Exchange of 
employers who registered but did not ultimately enroll, 
55% stated that “Choosing a health plan was not an 
easy process.”48 One small group purchaser interviewed 
for this report that tried unsuccessfully to buy coverage 
through the Exchange in both 2009 and 2010 found 
the process very confusing and said employees have “too 
much choice.”49 In the state’s survey following the first 
launch, 74% of employers said that a broker or agent had 
helped them through the process.50 
Massachusetts’ Business Express product has also 
struggled in its early phases, but with somewhat different 
issues relating to plan choice. The Connector has faced 
challenges providing an attractive mix of plan choices for 
employers and their employees. Large carriers attempted 
to withdraw in 2010 but the Connector leadership, 
recognizing the importance of having “brand name” 
products on its shelves, pushed hard to keep those carriers 
in and most have decided to stay in the program. As  
the Connector’s current Executive Director, Glen Shor, 
noted to us, for Business Express to be successful,  
“[w]e need to have some of the most popular plans in the 
Commonwealth; we need a good selection for people.”51
In its early days, the Connector piloted a small business 
product similar to Utah’s model, the “Contributory 
Plan,” in which small employers picked a benefit level 
and employees chose a product within that level. The 
Connector found through focus groups that small 
business employees liked the idea of being able to choose 
their own health plan, as opposed to the traditional 
approach of having the employer choose it for them.52 
However, enrollment did not meet expectations. A 
subsequent evaluation found that administrative 
complexities and a limited choice of plans (e.g., it included 
HMOs only) discouraged employers from enrolling.53 The 
pilot also engendered immediate opposition from carriers, 
particularly larger ones that perceived a threat to their 
market share.54
As a result, the Connector’s leadership decided to create 
Business Express as a small business exchange that 
offered traditional small group products, but with lower 
administrative fees than competing intermediaries. In 
April 2010, the Connector purchased a book of business 
from an insurance intermediary that served “micro-
groups,” businesses of 1–5 employees. Acquiring these 
small group purchasers from the Small Business Service 
Bureau (SBSB) accomplished two main goals: Business 
Express gained an initial 1,641 subscribers and was able to 
reduce administrative fees from 4.5% to 3.5%, a reduction 
that was matched by the competing intermediary, saving 
small employers market-wide roughly $300 per subscriber 
per year.55 Today, Business Express has roughly 4500 paid 
members (about 1500 employer groups).56
Except for the new business from SBSB, Business 
Express has been slow to expand its share of the small 
group market. Many small employers are loyal to 
their insurance brokers who help them understand 
their options and access coverage.57 And the brokers, 
in turn, view the Connector as a competitor that has 
aggressively encroached on their business and reduced 
their commissions. As one broker representative noted, 
the legislature’s intent in creating the Connector was 
to connect the uninsured with insurance, not to solicit 
employers already offering coverage. But the Connector 
has worked hard to do just that, earning the ire of the 
broker community. Noting that the Connector had 
accessed Department of Revenue information to send 
mailings to all small businesses in the state and tapped 
state funds to contract with SBSB for their enrolled 
groups, the broker we spoke to commented on an 
“insatiable appetite for the Connector to create legislated 
competitive advantages for itself.”58 
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Perhaps the most important issue with respect to the 
success of any exchange is the affordability of the 
coverage. The premiums that employees pay in Utah’s 
Exchange market are complicated by the Exchange’s 
goal of providing for employee choice of plans while still 
offering group coverage. Essentially the Exchange must 
first establish a group rate based on the overall risk of the 
small group and then determine the premium to be paid 
by individual employees and their dependents. To do so, 
once an employer expresses interest in participating, the 
Exchange requires each employee to complete a lengthy 
health history questionnaire and provide underwriting 
information to the insurance carriers, who use the 
information to rate the group. The group’s rating and the 
employer’s contribution, combined with the employee’s 
age and family composition, determine the prices that 
the employee sees when he or she accesses the Exchange 
website to choose a plan. To mitigate adverse selection 
among participating carriers, the insurers have a complex 
system of risk adjustments developed by the Risk Adjuster 
Board.59 As mentioned above, the state does not provide 
additional subsidies to help employees afford coverage.
Early reaction to the Utah Exchange highlighted that costs 
were actually higher inside Utah’s exchange. In response, the 
state enacted reforms in 2010 to ensure that “comparable 
coverage” would be priced at the same level in and out 
of the Exchange. Data are lacking to determine with 
precision if these reforms have succeeded in ensuring 
comparable pricing in and out of the Exchange. While 
Exchange enrollment has grown somewhat, there are 
reasons to be concerned that prices continue to differ. For 
the small group purchaser we interviewed, who tried to 
purchase coverage through the Exchange again in 2010 
hoping prices had come down, premiums were $60–150 
a month higher than for a comparable product outside of 
the Exchange. According to state officials, these pricing 
discrepancies may reflect the “non scientific” nature of the 
underwriting process in which a group rate is assigned 
based on the health status of each employee. Under the 
ACA, rating based on health status will be prohibited in 
2014, so employees enrolling through the Exchange will 
no longer have to submit to underwriting.
Another possible reason for the higher rates in Utah’s 
Exchange is that carriers are building in extra risk since 
they don’t know which employees will pick their plans 
through the Exchange—under its employee choice model, 
employees of a given business are no longer guaranteed 
to enroll in the same plan. If this is the case, it suggests 
that the current system of risk adjustment developed in 
conjunction with the Risk Adjuster Board is not sufficient 
to allay the fears of some health plans that they will be the 
victims of adverse selection when employees are given a 
choice among multiple plans. 
Another issue raised about the effectiveness of the 
reforms is that pricing need only be comparable for the 
same carrier and if the group renews on its anniversary 
date of its current coverage. A number of stakeholders 
mentioned that because of the difficulties in completing 
the enrollment process (which includes submitting health 
questionnaires, group and individual underwriting, 
and employees choosing their health plan options) by 
the anniversary date deadline, a group may lose the 
comparable pricing protection if the timeline is not met.
For Massachusetts, the success and sustainability of its 
health reform effort hinges on making coverage affordable 
for consumers and small business owners. At the same 
time it imposes a requirement that all residents purchase 
insurance, the Commonwealth confronts some of the 
highest health care costs in the country, with average 
family premiums at $14,723 and projected annual 
increases in premiums of 6%.60 
Affordability for Consumers and Small Businesses
Utah has also found insurance brokers to be critical 
to the participation of small employers. Without an 
insurance broker to assist in navigating the choices, 
it appears to be very difficult for small employers 
and employees to navigate and understand the wide 
variety of plan options in Utah’s Health Exchange. 
Changes required by the ACA in 2014 will require some 
standardization of plans as an essential benefits package 
and benefit tiers (Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum) 
are established. This may address some of the difficulties 
that consumers and employers currently face in choosing 
a plan. 
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Thus, the Connector not only provides premium 
subsidies for families up to 300% of the federal poverty 
level, it also uses its leverage as a “large purchaser” 
of coverage through CommCare to lower costs for 
enrollees and taxpayers. As noted above, CommCare 
is the access point for subsidized health insurance for 
approximately 158,000 Massachusetts residents. As such 
it is essentially a separate risk pool, with no “outside” 
market to compete with. If a resident is eligible for 
premium subsidies (and not eligible for other coverage), 
CommCare is the only place to access them.
For CommCare’s first three years, the only plans 
eligible to participate were four managed care plans 
under contract with MassHealth, the state Medicaid 
program.61 However, the Connector was under no 
obligation to accept their bids, and has administered 
the exchange in a manner designed to encourage plans 
to submit the lowest possible bids. For example, the 
Connector automatically enrolls participants who fail to 
choose a plan into the lowest cost plan. The Connector 
also administers risk sharing to protect plans against 
enrolling disproportionately costly individuals. And 
the requirement that enrollees pay the difference if they 
choose a plan that is more costly drives enrollment to the 
lower cost plans.62
In addition, in 2009, the statutory limitation on health 
plans’ eligibility for CommCare ended, and in 2010 
the Connector added a new health plan to CommCare: 
Celticare, sponsored by Centene, a national for-
profit Medicaid carrier. According to some observers, 
the Connector worked hard to ensure Celticare’s 
participation, with an aim to expand members’ plan 
choices and leverage lower prices from the original 
four plans.63 This effort was successful, resulting in the 
first new plan in Massachusetts in almost two decades, 
and successfully garnering lower bids from the other 
participating plans.64,65
The Connector’s efforts to aggressively manage cost 
growth in CommCare have produced savings for the 
state. Since the inception of CommCare in 2006 through 
fiscal year 2010, the average annual rate of increase in 
CommCare premiums per covered person has been held 
under 5%—about half the rate of growth in commercial 
health insurance. The resulting savings for the state are 
estimated to be $16–$20 million in FY 2010, and roughly 
$21 million in savings expected in FY 2011.66
The Connector has far less ability to constrain 
cost growth or provide cheaper products inside 
CommChoice. As noted above, state law requires that 
prices for health insurance products be the same inside 
and outside the Connector.67 As a result, if plans were 
to offer discounts to the Connector, they would have to 
commensurately lower their prices for plans outside the 
Connector. As one Board member told us, CommChoice 
is a small book of business for the plans, meaning the 
Connector doesn’t have sufficient market power to 
demand big discounts.68 
However, the Connector leadership points to empowered 
consumer decision-making as one mechanism for helping 
connect people with lower prices for coverage. Within 
CommChoice, plans with a lower cost structure have a 
greater market share inside than they do in the outside 
market. Conversely, one of the Commonwealth’s higher-
cost plans with a gold-plated network has a smaller 
market share inside the Connector than it does outside. 
Kingsdale and others attribute this to consumers’ ability 
to shop with confidence among plans that have received 
the Connector’s Seal of Approval, and use web-based tools 
to compare benefits.69
Providing affordable insurance options has been a 
challenge in Business Express, the Connector’s small 
business exchange. Almost everyone we interviewed 
agrees: this is one area in which the Connector has fallen 
short of its goals. The reasons cited are numerous: the 
urgency to launch the individual market exchange led to a 
lack of early focus on the small group market, opposition 
from brokers and health plans, and the inability of the 
Connector to differentiate itself from existing purchasing 
pools (called intermediaries) that currently serve most 
small businesses.70
As yet, the Connector has been unable to meet small 
employers’ most pressing need: lower insurance prices. 
The Connector’s proponents hope that it can soon gain a 
modest price advantage with employers through further 
cuts in administrative charges and a new state initiative to 
offer subsidies and technical assistance to small businesses 
that establish wellness programs. This assistance is 
available only to eligible businesses that enroll through 
the Connector.71 In addition, beginning in 2014, the ACA 
will provide health insurance tax credits to eligible small 
businesses in both Utah and Massachusetts, if they enroll 
through the state insurance exchanges.72
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By any measure, Massachusetts has done extensive work 
to educate residents and businesses about the 2006 
reforms. Observers have summed it up as a “top down, 
bottom up” approach.73 Outreach included mailings 
to new residents with the help of the state realtors’ 
association, mailings to all taxpayers and small businesses 
through the Department of Revenue, informational 
posters and brochures at the Registry of Motor Vehicles 
and paid advertising—television, radio and print.74
In addition, the Connector staff sponsored 30 events in 
20 communities designed to educate and, where possible, 
enroll individuals. The Connector’s partnership with the 
Boston Red Sox was also particularly helpful in reaching 
younger uninsured residents, particularly young men, 
with information about the new requirement to obtain 
health insurance.75
The Connector relies on the Medicaid program to 
perform CommCare eligibility and enrollment functions, 
which has been helpful in simplifying enrollment in 
subsidized insurance.76 In addition, the Connector 
uses one application for all public programs, so that 
individuals don’t have to apply to multiple agencies 
to find out for which programs they are eligible. And 
the Connector has staff devoted to troubleshooting 
consumers’ enrollment issues.77
Moreover, the state spends $3.5 million annually 
in grants to 51 community based organizations to 
provide application and renewal assistance. A recent 
evaluation has concluded the grant program has played 
a “significant role in achieving the health care reform 
goal.”78 One observer noted that many community 
groups are “deputized” to work directly with state 
Medicaid and CommCare enrollment staff to resolve 
consumers’ problems and help them enroll in the right 
program.79 Many of these groups have found that 
consumer outreach needs to be continuous. Because 
many individuals first enroll through a hospital or clinic 
when they have an immediate health care need, it can 
be more difficult to get them to renew their coverage a 
year later when they are healthy and don’t place as high 
a priority on health insurance.80
A number of features make enrollment relatively simple. 
As mentioned above, the Connector website facilitates a 
simple, streamlined shopping experience for individuals 
signing up through CommChoice. And as one former 
Board member told us, both the process and prohibition 
on medical underwriting make the shopping experience 
“respectful” by removing the requirement that a potential 
enrollee report any pre-existing conditions.81 In fact, 70% 
of those who complete an application for CommChoice 
enroll in coverage.82
However, other features are unnecessarily complicated 
and present barriers for consumers. For example, 
coordinating coverage between public programs and 
private plans has not been seamless. In particular,  
the dates for enrollment and disenrollment between 
public and private coverage are not aligned, so that 
individuals losing Medicaid eligibility early in a month 
must wait until the first of the following month to  
enroll in CommCare.83 
The legislature also recently enacted open enrollment 
periods in response to concerns about individuals 
“jumping” from self-insured employer-sponsored 
plans to individual market coverage in order to access 
state-mandated benefits such as bariatric surgery and 
IVF.84 The state also changed the definition of “eligible 
individual” to exclude those with access to employer-
sponsored coverage.85 These changes have resulted in a 
small decline in CommChoice enrollment.86
Given the relatively low enrollment in Utah’s Exchange, 
the question arises as to how many of the barriers to 
participation are related to cost, difficulties inherent in 
any change, and/or enrollment barriers and complexity in 
the system. According to the state’s survey of employers, 
high cost was the primary reason for nonparticipation. 
However, 21 of 66 surveyed groups didn’t participate 
because of the complexity of the health questionnaire 
(necessitated by the underwriting process), the application 
process, the timeline and other factors. The top specific 
reason given (55%) was that the “Universal Health 
application was very difficult and hard to complete.”87 
While the health questionnaire has been improved, it 
still appears to be a barrier to participation (in concert 
with the short timelines employers and employees have 
to participate in the process). When reapplying in 2010, 
employees of a small group purchaser that had applied the 
Outreach and Access
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previous year found the form a little more user-friendly 
but employees still had to provide a great deal of medical 
history and had to start from scratch even though they 
had filled out the questionnaire in the previous year.88 
Employees often expressed concerns about the intrusion 
into their privacy inherent in the process.89 As noted 
above, once the ACA’s rating reforms are implemented in 
2014, employees should no longer be required to complete 
a health underwriting questionnaire.
The Utah Exchange has also struggled with its 
technology, currently being provided by private vendors. 
Numerous problems were identified, from login passwords 
not working to employees being charged premiums for 
someone who isn’t enrolled.90 Because Utah’s Exchange 
is run with such a limited staff and investment from state 
government, it is hard to resolve glitches as they arise. 
Funding provided through the ACA may help the state 
address some of these issues.
Lessons Learned
States seeking to establish their own exchanges do 
not need to choose either the Massachusetts or the 
Utah model. While the ACA sets some minimum 
standards (i.e., eliminating health status rating, 
limiting consumers’ out-of-pocket costs, and requiring 
coverage of a comprehensive set of benefits), states have 
considerable discretion to pick and choose elements from 
Massachusetts and Utah that will best serve the residents 
of their state.
Choice and Quality
Because choice and quality of coverage are so critical to 
consumers and small business owners, many states will 
want to pay critical attention to the role of their exchange 
in providing consumers with a reasonable number of 
attractive plan choices. Reaching a reasonable number 
requires striking a balance between establishing consumer 
protections and making the exchange attractive for 
plans. Many experts have observed a dichotomy between 
exchanges that act as an active purchaser and those 
that serve as a market organizer. The Massachusetts’ 
and Utah’s experiences demonstrate that whatever the 
strategy, exchanges must be attentive to the needs of both 
consumers and insurance carriers. 
In Massachusetts’ case, rather than “active purchaser,” 
a more apt description of the Connector’s market role 
when it comes to CommChoice would perhaps be 
“active market organizer.”91 While it has little leverage 
to negotiate on price with insurance carriers, it can and 
does effectively use its management of the store shelves to 
provide consumers with high-value products.
For exchanges that pursue a strategy geared toward active 
purchasing, it requires sensitivity to the markets in which 
the exchange operates, nimbleness in adjusting standards 
in response to data on consumers’ preferences, and 
working in partnership with plans to provide products 
that meet consumers’ needs. As noted by one Connector 
board member, being an aggressive purchaser requires a 
lot of work, staff time and market expertise. She went on 
to say: “If you want to take ‘any willing plan,’ it’s a lot 
easier. But then you don’t add much value, either.”92
Utah’s Exchange is open to any willing carrier that 
meets certain minimal requirements and features a large 
number of individual products offered by four carriers. 
The four carriers participating in the Exchange represent 
a combined 62% of market share in Utah’s group market. 
Of the top five carriers, three are participating.93 A 
market organizer strategy, therefore, does not guarantee 
participation of carriers—exchanges must work to attract 
and keep carriers that offer good value. This job will be 
made easier in 2014, when plans will need to participate 
in exchanges in order to access premium subsidies.
In addition, the significant number of employees in Utah’s 
Exchange who simply remain in the product they were 
in before suggests that, at least initially, employees need 
substantial help in choosing among insurance options. Both 
Utah and Massachusetts’ experiences indicate that too many 
product choices can be overwhelming for consumers.94
Affordability
It appears that for exchanges to be successful, they must 
address the critical issue of affordability of coverage. 
Premiums for family coverage in an employer-sponsored 
plan average $13,770 nationally, making comparable 
coverage in an exchange unaffordable without substantial 
subsidies.95 This fact, coupled with the ACA’s requirement 
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that individuals purchase insurance, make premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies essential to helping people obtain 
adequate and affordable coverage. Recognizing this, 
Massachusetts made their first priority the operation of 
their subsidized program, CommCare. As a result, they 
have had substantial coverage gains for families under 
300% FPL, from 77% in June 2006 to 91% in the Fall of 
2009.96 Conversely, where coverage is unsubsidized, i.e., 
in the Massachusetts CommChoice program and Utah’s 
Health Exchange, cost remains an enormous challenge 
for individuals and small business owners, and enrollment 
has been far less robust. In 2014, the ACA will provide 
subsidies for families up to 400% FPL that enroll through 
exchanges, substantially expanding access to more 
affordable coverage. But for unsubsidized individuals and 
small business owners, an insurance exchange by itself 
will not make coverage more affordable.
Utah has worked to address the affordability of coverage 
for small business owners by allowing them to make a 
defined contribution to their employees’ premium. While 
there may be significant benefits to a defined contribution/
employee choice model, there are drawbacks as well. 
Employees tend to like the idea of greater choice, but fixing 
employer contributions to a set dollar amount, especially in 
the absence of any subsidies, is likely to raise the proportion 
paid by employees as health costs increase over time.
One effect of the model is to minimize the employer’s role 
in health insurance decisions—they provide only a fixed 
contribution while the exchange organizes plan options 
and employees choose among them. But employers 
contribute to premiums because they see providing 
coverage as a means to attract workers in competitive 
labor markets. These employers compete based on their 
ability to provide affordable and high quality coverage to 
their employees, and this often requires significant levels 
of employer contributions and involvement in choosing a 
plan. Moreover, the owners of small businesses often use 
their companies’ group policies to purchase coverage for 
themselves and their families. As one insurance industry 
representative told us, employers continue to look at the 
purchasing decision as one that turns on the overall value 
to the group, rather than a matter for individuals to weigh 
and decide for themselves.97 
Over the longer term, as federal and state policymakers 
work to implement payment and delivery system reforms 
that, over time, could moderate the growth in health 
care spending, they should not neglect the potential of 
exchanges to “bend the cost curve.” For example, states 
could build on the work in Utah and Massachusetts to 
implement web-based decision-tools to guide consumers 
towards more value-oriented plan choices.98 Because 
the ACA requires minimum quality standards for all 
participating plans, consumers signing up through 
exchanges will be able to shop for less expensive plans with 
more confidence that they are getting a quality product.
Outreach and Access
An early and important job for all state exchanges will be 
public education, outreach and enrollment. Exchanges 
don’t just need health plans to participate. They will 
need to attract a critical mass of enrollees and/or small 
businesses to be sustainable.99
One critical lesson from Massachusetts is that a big early 
investment in education and outreach is essential. Studies 
have demonstrated that the Commonwealth’s “top down, 
bottom up” approach, including $3.5 million annually 
in grants to local community groups to knock on doors 
and public service announcements from the Red Sox were 
key to reform’s success in that state.100 The Massachusetts 
experience also illustrates the importance of sustaining 
those efforts after the initial launch to ensure consumers 
are aware of their options when it comes time to renew 
their coverage.
Once consumers are motivated to shop for insurance 
through the exchange, states must also make the 
eligibility and enrollment process as simple and easy as 
possible in order to ensure that enrollment is robust. As 
discussed, Utah’s complicated health questionnaire was 
the top specific reason given by employers who chose 
not to enroll through the Exchange.101 The extremely 
small budget and staff of Utah’s exchange appear to have 
limited the state’s ability to address problems that have 
arisen in the enrollment process—problems which have 
clearly contributed to low enrollment in the Exchange.
In conclusion, the experience of both Massachusetts and 
Utah underscores the importance of ongoing refinement 
as feedback is obtained from both consumers and small 
employers who interact with the exchange. Exchanges will 
need some degree of authority and flexibility to identify 
and respond to consumers’ needs as they are identified. 
Involvement of consumers in the exchange governance 
structure, as well as focus groups and other efforts to solicit 
feedback from “end users” of the exchange will prove 
critical to ensure that exchanges function effectively.
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